The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) presents itself as a regional forum built on sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, mutual respect and cooperation. These principles make its call in the Bishkek Declaration for an inclusive government in Afghanistan important — but they also raise a fundamental question of consistency.
There is merit in encouraging broader political participation in Afghanistan. Representation of different ethnic, political and social groups could contribute to national reconciliation and lasting stability after decades of conflict. But if inclusivity is considered essential for Afghanistan, should the same principle not carry equal weight across the SCO region?
The SCO Charter emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference in states’ internal affairs and does not specifically require member countries to include every ethnic, religious or political group in government. The organization must therefore ensure that its position on Afghanistan is not perceived as a selective political standard.
This matters particularly when concerns over minority rights, political dissent and representation also exist within SCO member states. Human-rights organizations have, for instance, raised concerns regarding religious minorities and critics in India, including Muslims. India should not be singled out, but neither should any powerful member be exempt from principles advocated for a weaker state.
The SCO cannot credibly criticize double standards in the existing international order while allowing similar inconsistencies within its own framework. If political inclusion is a principle, it should be advocated consistently; if non-interference is a principle, it too must apply consistently.
Pakistan now has an important opportunity to help bridge this contradiction. As SCO chair for 2026–27 and host of the 2027 summit, Islamabad can move the Afghan debate beyond declarations towards structured regional engagement.
Pakistan’s concerns over militant groups operating from Afghan territory are legitimate and require effective action from Kabul. But Afghanistan cannot be viewed solely through the lens of terrorism. Border security, trade, refugees, education, economic cooperation, political engagement and regional connectivity must also form part of the dialogue.
Recent engagement with Afghan diplomatic representatives through Pakistani academic and strategic forums could be useful if developed into sustained diplomacy. Rather than simply presenting Kabul with demands, Pakistan and other SCO members should encourage dialogue on security and broader political participation while respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty.
The challenge before the SCO is therefore larger than Afghanistan. It must decide whether it will become merely another centre of geopolitical power or a forum capable of applying principles fairly to powerful and weaker states alike.
As Pakistan leads the organization towards the 2027 summit, it should promote a straightforward approach: dialogue instead of dictates, engagement instead of isolation, and equal standards for all.
A multipolar world will have little meaning if old double standards are merely replaced by new ones.


