By Zaffar Goya
For the past few days, news of the wheat crisis, rising prices and the government’s decision to import wheat has dominated public discussion. I write as someone who served as Director General in the Food Department of Balochistan for more than 2 years and closely observed the entire system of wheat procurement, storage, distribution and food security.
In Pakistan, wheat is far more than a crop. It is the foundation of national food security. Since, the daily food of general public depends on bread, the availability, price and reserves of wheat are not merely economic questions. They are matters of social and national stability.
A wheat crisis never appears suddenly. It is born months earlier on the desks of policymakers. At harvest time the farmer feels it. A few months later the consumer pays for it by buying expensive flour. In the end the burden of billions of rupees in imports falls on the national treasury. Unfortunately, we usually act only when the crisis is already knocking at the door.
In 2022, when devastating floods struck Balochistan, land links to several districts of the province were cut off and many areas became isolated from the rest of the country. The biggest challenge then was not the mere presence of wheat but delivering it to the areas that needed it. That experience taught a basic truth: a food crisis does not arise only when wheat is short. It also arises when wheat is available but cannot reach the right place at the right time.
Around the world, food security does not mean production alone. It means an integrated system of production, procurement, storage, transport, distribution and strategic reserves.
The ordinary person imagines a simple process: the farmer grows wheat, the government buys it, flour mills turn it into flour and the matter ends. Reality is far more complex. Wheat policy consists of several stages: estimates of total production, consumption, requirement for strategic reserves and how any shortfall or surplus will be handled in time. Then comes procurement, storage, distribution to different districts, release to flour mills, and continuous market monitoring. If even one link in these stages becomes weak, the effects are felt across the entire province or country.
Today wheat prices have taken off. The farmer is once again disappointed. Middlemen, hoarders and large stockists are happy. The ordinary citizen is paying the price through rising flour costs. When a policy results in the farmer suffering a loss, the consumer bearing inflation, the government being forced to import and the benefit going only to middlemen and hoarders, a serious question arises: where exactly is the fault? It is in the crop or in the policy? Today’s situation is not merely a problem of shortage. It is a failure of policy continuity, wrong estimates, poor market management and delayed decisions.
The federal government has decided to import one million metric tons of wheat through TCP. Experts and the flour mills sector say the country faces a shortfall of about 2.5 million tons. The question is how we reached this point. This year, when the crop was ready, the farmer did not
receive a fair price. He used his land, bought seed, applied fertiliser, sprayed pesticides, arranged water, worked for months and bore weather risks. Yet at the time of sale he received a price far below his cost and labour. Today the same wheat is selling at 4,500 to 5,000 rupees per maund. A few months ago the farmer was forced to sell it at around 3,500 rupees. This difference did not go into the farmer’s pocket. The public also gained nothing. Those who bought wheat cheap and stored it are the ones benefiting from the rising prices today. This is why the wheat problem in Pakistan is not only about production. It is also about market governance.
Importing one million tons may cost around 70 billion rupees or more. In case of further imports the figure could rise to hundreds of billions. If the same capital had been spent on our own farmers a few months ago, it would have circulated in Pakistani villages, the Pakistani economy and the agricultural sector. Now the same money will strengthen foreign farmers and foreign economies, while the payment will come from our limited foreign exchange reserves. The government is already struggling with dollar shortages, debt and external payment pressures.
When even food needs must be met through imports, the issue ceases to be merely economic and becomes a matter of national food security.
Some people think this is only the farmer’s problem. It is not. When the farmer does not get a fair price he hesitates to grow wheat the next year. Production falls. The government imports. Foreign exchange is spent. Inflationary pressure rises. In the end the ordinary citizen pays the price in the form of expensive flour. The circle of loss starts with the farmer and reaches the entire nation.
Today the grower faces a strange situation. Fertiliser, pesticides, diesel, electricity and labour are all expensive, while the price of the crop remains uncertain. In such an environment planning for the next season becomes extremely difficult. If this situation continues, the farmer may gradually shift from wheat to other crops or lower-cost cultivation. That would be a serious threat to Pakistan’s food security.
We repeatedly fall victim to wheat crises, while our neighbouring country whose population is several times larger, faces relatively fewer such crises. The reason is not only higher production. The real difference lies in policy continuity. In India the farmer knows the Minimum Support Price before sowing. Government agencies procure according to a fixed procedure. Buffer stocks are maintained continuously. The market is monitored. If prices begin to rise unusually the government intervenes in time through its reserves. The point is not that India never faces problems. Climate change, price fluctuations and other challenges exist there too. The difference is that the crisis is managed before it becomes an emergency. We usually become active only when the crisis has already reached the people’s dining tables. We do not need to praise India. But if our neighbour, despite its huge population, is managing the wheat crisis relatively better through policy, buffer stocks, timely procurement and institutional stability, there is no harm in learning from that experience.
In Balochistan some people believe the wheat market should be left completely free. Others favour complete government control. Both extremes are harmful. Complete government control often creates unnecessary financial burden, delays, corruption and administrative problems. On the other hand, a completely free market gives extraordinary power to strong buyers, large stockists and hoarders. The real question is not whether the market should be free or controlled. The question is what the role of the state should be. The state should not act as a trader who fixes prices. It should be the guarantor of fair competition, the protector of both the farmer’s and the consumer’s interests, and the guardian of national food security. The absence of this balanced role has repeatedly brought us face to face with the same crises.
Every year we remain stuck in the same debate; why wheat was short this time, why prices rose, why imports became necessary or who hoarded. Then next year we repeating the same questions. The real need is not to react to a crisis but to prevent the crisis from arising. For this a few basic reforms are essential:
Pakistan needs a national wheat policy based on at least a ten-year vision, not one that changes every year. There must be agreement between the federation and all provinces. The agricultural sector cannot run on uncertain decisions. The farmer must know far before sowing what the government’s role will be, what the minimum price will be and what the procurement policy will be.
A digital and transparent data system must be established for production, consumption, reserves and future needs so that all decisions are based on reliable figures. When statistics themselves are disputed, policy also becomes uncertain. In Balochistan, agricultural and revenue figures for the same district are often contradictory.
Clear principles for strategic buffer stocks must be set in every province—how much wheat, where and how it should be stored. There must be a scientific and permanent standard to ensure food security.
Decisions on import and export should not be made on an emergency basis but through advance planning. If import becomes unavoidable, the decision should be taken when global prices are relatively low, not when the domestic crisis has intensified and the international market is taking advantage of the situation.
The farmer must receive a fair return for his labour. This does not mean the government should buy at high prices without limit. It means creating an environment in which the farmer is not forced to sell his crop at throwaway prices.
The private sector should be given a role in the stages of food security but with strong monitoring and transparent rules. Hoarding, creating artificial shortages and unfair monopoly over the market must not be acceptable. An active local government system can play an effective role in this.
Wheat policy is inseparably linked with overall agricultural policy. When the farmer continuously suffers losses in other crops while the prices of fertiliser, pesticides, diesel and electricity keep rising, his confidence breaks. A weak farmer cannot form the foundation of a strong economy.
Investment must be made in the capacity of the Food Department, the transport system and modern storage infrastructure so that the supply of food is not affected during floods, droughts or other emergencies.
Wheat is not just a crop. It is the name of the dining table in every Pakistani home, the worry of every mother, the wages of every labourer, the hope of every farmer and the food sovereignty of the state. Every year the farmer remains in loss. The consumer buys expensive flour. The government imports wheat worth billions. The profit is earned only by hoarders and middlemen. All this implies that the problem lies in our policy. Instead of waiting for a new crisis every year we should formulate a national wheat policy whose purpose is not merely to buy wheat but to protect the farmer’s confidence, the people’s food safety and the state’s economic sovereignty. Nations do not import crises. They prevent them from arising through foresight, planning and strong institutions.


